Leniency (Amnesty) Plus: A Building Block or a Trojan Horse? by Martyniszyn, Marek
Leniency (Amnesty) Plus: A Building Block or a Trojan Horse?
Martyniszyn, M. (2015). Leniency (Amnesty) Plus: A Building Block or a Trojan Horse? Journal of Antitrust
Enforcement, 3(2), 391-407. DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnv005
Published in:
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Antitrust Enforcement following peer
review. The version of record Martyniszyn, M 2015, 'Leniency (Amnesty) Plus: A Building Block or a Trojan Horse?' Journal of Antitrust
Enforcement, is available online at: http://antitrust.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/2/391
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:06. Mar. 2017
1 
 
Leniency (Amnesty) Plus:  
a Building Block or a Trojan Horse? 
Marek Martyniszyn* 
Leniency (amnesty) plus is one of the tools used in the fight against anticompetitive 
agreements. It allows a cartelist who did not manage to secure complete immunity 
under general leniency, to secure an additional reduction of sanctions in exchange 
for cooperation with the authorities with respect to operation of another prohibited 
agreement on an unrelated market. The instrument was developed in the United 
States and, in recent years, it was introduced in a number of jurisdictions. This article 
contextualises the operation of and rationale behind leniency plus, forewarning about 
its potential procollusive effects and the possibility of its strategic (mis)use by 
cartelists. It discusses theoretical, moral, and systemic (deterrence-related) problems 
surrounding this tool. It also provides a comparison of leniency plus in eleven 
jurisdictions, identifying common design flaws. This piece argues that leniency plus 
tends to be a problematic and poorly transplanted US legal innovation. Policy-makers 
considering its introduction should analyse it in light of institutional limits and local 
realities. Some of the regimes which already introduced it would be better off 
abandoning it. 
Keywords: leniency, leniency plus, amnesty, amnesty plus, immunity plus, bonus plus, self-
reporting, deterrence, cartels, whistleblowers, enforcement, penalty plus, omnibus question 
JEL Classifications: K21, K42, L13, L40, L49 
I. Introduction 
Leniency plus or amnesty plus1 is a tool, which allows a cartelist, who is unable to secure 
complete immunity under the leniency policy, to cooperate with an antitrust agency2 with 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law, Queen’s University Belfast. Email: m.martyniszyn@qub.ac.uk. Special thanks to the 
anonymous reviewers of the JAE, and to D Daniel Sokol, Andreas Stephan, and Bruce Wardhaugh for helpful 
comments. This paper was presented at the 2014 annual conferences of the Society of Legal Scholars and of the 
Irish Association of Law Teachers, and at the conference ‘the Fight against Hard Core Cartels in Europe’ 
organised by the Centre for Competition Policy (Universidad CEU San Pablo) in November 2014. The author is 
grateful to participants for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 Terms ‘immunity’, ‘leniency’, or ‘amnesty’ are used in different regimes to describe similar instruments of 
competition law enforcement, allowing a firm participating in a prohibited practice to come forward and receive 
complete or partial immunity from sanctions in exchange for cooperation with the agency. In the US context it 
means complete immunity from criminal prosecution for the firm and its cooperating employees, or for the 
individual only (if she applies on her own). In other regimes, such as the EU, where there are no criminal sanctions, 
the term ‘leniency’ is more often used. It describes a possibility of having the fine (for participation in a prohibited 
agreement) either waived or partly reduced. Hence terms such as ‘full immunity’ or ‘partial immunity’, ‘leniency’. 
This article uses the term ‘leniency’ as a generic one. Compare International Competition Network, Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement Manual. Chapter 2: Drafting and Implementing an Effective Leniency Policy; Subgroup 2: 
Enforcement Techniques (May 2009), 2, available at 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc341.pdf>. For discussion of general 
leniency see eg Nicolo Zingales, 'European and American Leniency Programmes: Two Models Towards 
Convergence?', 5(1) Competition Law Review 5 (2008); Amedeo Arena, 'Game Theory as a Yardstick for 
Antitrust Leniency Policy: the US, EU, and Italian Experiences in a Comparative Perspective', 11(1) Global Jurist 
(2011). 
2 Terms ‘antitrust’ and ‘competition law’ are used in this article interchangeably. The same applies to terms 
‘antitrust agencies’ and ‘competition authority’. 
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regard to operation of another cartel on an unrelated market. In exchange, the firm benefits not 
only from immunity in relation to its participation in the second cartel (under the leniency 
policy), but also from an additional reduction of sanctions for its involvement in the first 
investigated illegal practice (hence the ‘plus’). As an instrument leniency plus is aimed at 
multimarket cartelists (firms operating on a single market cannot avail of it). As an element of 
a leniency programme, leniency plus should serve the same goals. It should help to destabilize, 
uncover and sanction existing prohibited agreements, and deter their creation. 
The instrument was developed and is considered to operate successfully in the US.3 The 
recent investigations of numerous auto parts cartels are reported to have been initiated thanks 
to leniency plus.4 As it will be discussed, in the US this instrument is an integral and if 
applicable—compulsory (not optional) element of the leniency programme. It is often 
promoted as a tool having ‘the potential to bring a series of cartels tumbling down like a house 
of cards.’5 In recent years leniency plus—in various forms—was introduced in a number of 
jurisdictions.6 Interestingly, it is not an element of the EU’s leniency policy.7 In some regimes, 
for example in Bulgaria, while existing on the books leniency plus has never been used. In at 
least one jurisdiction it has been removed from the toolbox a few years after its introduction.8 
International Competition Network’s (ICN) Enforcement Manual mentions leniency plus as 
one of the less-frequently occurring elements of leniency programmes.9 
This article makes an original contribution by contextualising operation and rationale behind 
leniency plus, and by forewarning about its potential procollusive effects and the possibility of 
its strategic (mis)use by cartelists. It points to the limited use of the existing economic models, 
which focus on the interplay between firms and agencies and disregard the impact of criminal 
sanctions and leniency for individuals. This article offers also a comparison of leniency plus 
instruments in eleven jurisdictions. It mitigates optimism about leniency plus. It is claimed that 
while—from consumers’ perspective—it may be a useful tool in some regimes, it is likely to 
be unnecessary or, worse, anticompetitive in other jurisdictions. This article argues that 
leniency plus tends to be a poorly transplanted US legal innovation. Policy-makers considering 
its addition to the enforcement toolbox should consider it in light of institutional limits and 
local realities. 
                                                          
3 The US Department of Justice (DoJ) Antitrust Division at various occasions reported that over half of its 
international cartel’s investigations were initiated thanks to evidence obtained as a result of investigation of 
separate industries, or thanks to leads generated during such investigations. Yet it has not been clarified how many 
commenced thanks to leniency plus itself. See eg Scott D. Hammond, 'Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency 
Program' (Chilean Competition Day, 9 September 2009), 9, available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.pdf>. 
4 Compare John M. Connor, 'Is Auto Parts Evolving into a Supercartel?', American Antitrust Institute Working 
Paper No. 13-06 (2013), at 4, available at 
<http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/AAI%20Working%20Paper%2013-06.pdf>; Howard W 
Fogt, 'Global Auto Parts Antitrust Probe: Compliance Programs must be a Top Priority', 22(3) Westlaw Journal 
Antitrust 1 (2014), at 3. 
5 Thomas O. Barnett, 'Criminal Enforcement of Antitrust Laws: The U.S. Model' (Fordham Competition Law 
Institute's Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, 14 September 2006), 5, 
available at <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/218336.pdf>. 
6 See Table 1 below. 
7 For listing of some of the regimes which did not introduce this instrument see n 55 below. 
8 Portugal initially introduced leniency plus in 2006. In 2012 this instrument has been removed from the 
toolbox. Compare Art. 7 of Law 39/2006 of 25 August 2006 available at 
<http://dre.pt/pdf1sdip/2006/08/16400/61846185.pdf> and Law 19/2012 of 8 May 2012 available at 
<http://dre.pt/pdf1s/2012/05/08900/0240402427.pdf>. 
9 International Competition Network (n 1) at 5. 
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II. Disclaimer re challenges and limits of comparing rules 
When discussing leniency plus comparatively, one must keep in mind at least two differences 
between competition regimes. First, in some jurisdictions, especially in the US, antitrust 
violators face criminal sanctions. These are fines (for firms and individuals) and jail sentences. 
In fact, the US authorities are of the view that holding culpable individuals accountable, by 
seeking prison time, is the most effective way to deter and punish cartel activity.10 Other 
regimes, in particular the EU, have no criminal sanctions and often no individual sanctions at 
all. Civil fines imposed on businesses are often the only price to be paid for breaches of 
competition law.11 Second, those regimes which introduced individual sanctions allow 
individuals to apply for leniency on their own behalf (regardless of whether the firm had done 
so).12 In jurisdictions not foreseeing individual sanctions, there is no individual leniency. 
Both differences matter greatly. Threat of individual, especially criminal sanctions (if 
actively enforced13) combined with a possibility of securing individual leniency changes the 
whistleblowing game. The moment individuals are able to avoid sanctions (especially the 
prospect of jail) leniency becomes more appealing—both for them individually and for firms 
(as they need to factor in a real possibility of independent individual applications, see Figure 1 
below).14 In such context, leniency plus may be a promising refinement of the enforcement 
system. In jurisdictions without individual sanctions and leniency, the situation is different. 
Cooperation with the authorities is more likely to be part of firm’s strategic game (of playing 
off competitors or worse—the agency after reaping supra-competitive profits), since cartelists 
run a lesser risk of being uncovered (as there are no individual whistle-blowers acting under 
threat of sanctions, such as jail time, see Figure 2 below). From this perspective, introduction 
of leniency plus may be only adding further finesse to firms’ strategic games. 
These two differences between competition regimes themselves make the comparative 
discussion of leniency plus challenging. They also remind us that a tool transplanted into 
different institutional frameworks may have different effects. 
III. Leniency plus in the US—its origin and the place in the toolbox 
                                                          
10 Scott D. Hammond, 'The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement over the Last Two Decades' (The 
24th Annual National institute on White Collar Crime, Miami, 25 February 2010), 11, available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.pdf>. 
11 Some regimes provide for individual civil sanctions. For example, the UK introduced individual 
disqualification orders for directors involved in cartels. See Andreas Stephan, 'Disqualification Orders for 
Directors Involved in Cartels', 2(6) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 529 (2011). 
12 See eg US Department of Justice, Leniency Policy for Individuals (10 August 1994), available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.pdf>; Office of Fair Trading, Applications for leniency and 
no-action in cartel cases. OFT's detailed guidance on the principles and process (July 2013), 2.33-2.37, available 
at <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/OFT1495.pdf>. 
13 That is not always the case. For example, in Ireland custodian sanctions for breaches of competition law 
were introduced in 1996, but since then no single person served a day in jail for such violations (albeit one person 
served time for failing to pay fine imposed in relation to a breach of competition law). See further Patrick Massey, 
'Criminalising Competition Law Offences – A Review of Irish Experience', 3(2) New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 154 (2012). 
14 It is worth recalling that the first antitrust leniency programme, introduced in the US in 1978, was a failure. 
Among other deficiencies, it did not extend leniency to employees of the cooperating firms. This changed with 
the programme’s revision in 1993. Moreover, in 1994 the DoJ announced its new leniency policy for individuals, 
who since then are able to apply for leniency on their own behalf. See US Department of Justice, Corporate 
Leniency Policy (10 August 1993), available at <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf>; US 
Department of Justice. 
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Leniency plus originates from the US, where it is known under the name ‘amnesty plus’. As a 
policy it began shaping in mid-1990s in the context of the investigations of international 
cartels.15 It was formalised as an element of the leniency programme at the end of the 1990s.16 
Under the US rules on amnesty plus ‘the company can also receive a substantial additional 
reduction in its fine for its participation in the first offense (i.e., the offense to which the 
company is pleading guilty)’.17 The level of the additional discount (the ‘plus’ reward) is not 
fixed. It depends on a number of factors. Relevant considerations are, in particular:18 (1) the 
strength of the provided evidence, (2) the significance of the uncovered violation (in terms of 
the volume of commerce involved, the geographic scope, and the number of entities involved), 
and (3) the likelihood of the other conspiracy being uncovered without the voluntary 
disclosure.19 The first two factors carry the greatest weight.20 The fact that the scale of the 
additional reduction is not predefined in the US makes it more difficult for cartelists to use 
amnesty plus strategically. In the Crompton case—representing the high end of the reductions’ 
spectrum—the firm, which is said to have provided ‘exemplary cooperation’, benefited from 
an ‘extraordinary’ 59% fine reduction (representing more than $70 million) under amnesty 
plus.21 Crompton (later renamed Chemtura) was second-in-the-door (hence, unable to secure 
immunity from sanctions) in the context of the Antitrust Division’s rubber chemicals 
international investigation. The firm conducted an internal investigation, which lead it to file 
for leniency on four other markets with combined annual US sales in hundreds of millions.22 
Moreover, Crompton filed for and secured leniency in Canada and in the EU, what possibly 
enabled authorities to coordinate their enforcement efforts. The firm was also reported to have 
disciplined or terminated contracts with individuals involved in or aware of these agreements. 
It also introduced compliance programme, appointed an ethics and compliance officer, and 
rewrote its business conducts and ethics code.23  
What is critical, amnesty plus is not a self-standing and optional instrument in the Antitrust 
Division’s toolbox. It is an integral part of the leniency programme and an element of what can 
be referred to as a tripartite ‘plus package’. This essential circumstance is surprisingly often 
disregarded in both legal and economic literature. The plus package includes also penalty plus 
and omnibus question instruments. 
                                                          
15 Donald C. Klawiter, 'Corporate Leniency in the Age of International Cartels: The American Experience', 14 
Antitrust 13 (2000), at 14. 
16 For its early formulation see Gary R. Spratling, 'Making Companies an Offer They shouldn't Refuse' (35th 
Annual Symposium on Associations and Antitrust of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia's, 16 
February 1999), 6-7, available at <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/2247.pdf>. 
17 US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Manual, 5th ed (March 2014), III-102, available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/>. 
18 Scott D. Hammond, 'Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Antitrust Division's Leniency Program and 
Model Leniency Letters' (19 November 2008), 9, available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239583.pdf>. 
19 This is assessed by looking whether there was any overlap in the reported conspiracies’ corporate 
participation and among the executives involved. 
20 Hammond (n 18) 9. 
21  Scott D. Hammond, 'Measuring the Value of Second-In Cooperation in Corporate Plea Negotiations' (54th 
Annual American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting, 29 March 2006), 2, 14, available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/215514.pdf>; US v Crompton Corporation, 399 F.Supp.2d 1047 
(ND Cal 2005). For trial pleadings see US v Crompton Corporation, 2004 WL 632768 (ND Cal 2005). 
22 These were conspiracies among producers of ethylene propylene diene monomers (EPDM) rubber, heat 
stabilizers, nitrile rubber, and urethanes. Silvestrini Marc, 'Connecticut's Crompton to Plead Guilty to Rubber 
Chemicals Plot', Regional Business News: Waterbury Republican-American, 16 March 2004. 
23 Andrew Wood, 'Crompton: Trying to Rebuild Confidence', Chemical Week, 24 March 2004. 
5 
 
Penalty plus is frequently referred to as flip side of amnesty plus,24 or simply ‘the ‘stick’ 
side to the amnesty plus carrot'.25 If a firm cooperating with the agency does not avails of 
amnesty plus and does not disclose its participation in another prohibited agreement, and it gets 
later uncovered and prosecuted, the Division will urge the court to consider that failure—both 
on behalf of the firm and its executives—as an aggravating sentencing factor.26 Hence, from 
design perspective amnesty plus and penalty plus are not only interlinked, but inseverable. Not 
availing of the first, should lead to severe consequences under the other. That said, the actual 
instances of penalty plus application are very rare or not well-reported. A recent case is that of 
Bridgestone Corporation, which agreed to plead guilty and pay a criminal fine of $425 million 
for price-fixing of certain auto parts.27 The fine was significantly increased—under penalty 
plus—as Bridgestone was earlier involved in the marine hose cartel and although it pleaded 
guilty,28 it had not revealed its participation in the auto parts cartel.29 Noteworthy, Bridgestone 
decided to litigate in court rather than to settle with the DoJ. The only other reported case 
involving penalty plus is the one of Hoechst AG. In 2003 this German firm pleaded guilty and 
agreed to pay $12 million fine for participation in a hard-core cartel on the world markets for 
monochloroacetic acid (MCCAA).30 The fine amounted to about 70% of the volume of affected 
commerce and it was about 30% above the maximum fine foreseen in the US Sentencing 
Guidelines. Moreover, there executives were ‘carved out’ of the plea agreement. This upward 
departure from the Sentencing Guidelines was the effect of penalty plus and recidivism. In 
1990s the firm was involved in and convicted of price-fixing on another market. It did not 
disclose then its involvement in the anticompetitive conduct in relation to the MCCAA. 
The third element of the plus package only adds to that dynamics. It is a proactive 
investigatory technique, now routinely used and referred to as the omnibus question.31 At the 
end of an interview the investigators ask witnesses whether they are aware of any other 
prohibited practices.32 Under US rules a cartelist is requited to inform the agency not only about 
another but about all other prohibited practices, in which it is involved. An individual would 
be subpoenaed and compelled to provide sworn testimony under the penalty of perjury,33 which 
may include a fine and/ or a prison sentence of up to five years.34 A witness may not avoid 
                                                          
24 See eg ibid, at 7. 
25 Hammond (n 3) 11. 
26 The Division would pursue a fine or jail sentence at or above (in case of recidivism) the upper end of the 
US Sentencing Guidance range. US Department of Justice (n 17) at III-103; Scott D. Hammond, 'An Update of 
the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program' (Address before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Cartel 
Enforcement Roundtable, Washington, 16 November 2005), 12, available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/213247.pdf>. 
27 US Department of Justice, 'Bridgestone Corp. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price Fixing on Automobile Parts 
Installed in U.S. Cars', 13 February 2014, available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/303743.pdf>. 
28 US Department of Justice, 'Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies 
to Rig Bigs and Bribe Foreign Government Officials', 15 September 2011, available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2011/275025.pdf>. 
29 Fogt (n 4) at 3. 
30 Scott D. Hammond, 'Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program' (ICN Workshop on Leniency 
Programs, 22-23 November 2004), 17, n 6, available at <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.pdf>. 
See also US Department of Justice, 'German Chemical Company to Plead Guilty to Criminal Antitrust 
Conspiracy', 6 February 2003, available at <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2003/200738.pdf>. 
31 Another such technique is ‘cartel profiling’, which envisages investigating culpable executives’ 
responsibility for firm’s activity on other markets as well as identifying their mentors. Hammond (n 3) 10. 
32 US Department of Justice (n 17) at III-102. 
33 Hammond (n 3) 10. 
34 18 US Code §1621 (Perjury generally). 
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answering, or respond deceitfully without facing the threat of sanctions. Therefore the use of 
omnibus question reinforces the effectiveness of the amnesty-penalty plus by limiting the 
circumstances, in which prohibited agreements can remain undetected.  
The leniency plus in the US is therefore a part of a broader plus package, which effectively 
raises the stakes on both ends of the reward-penalty spectrum. There is an extra carrot (leniency 
plus), but there is also an extra stick (the extra penalty). The omnibus question helps to limit 
the situations in which one can avoid the carrot-and-stick dilemma.  
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Figure 1 Cartelist’s (firm’s) decision making: US leniency with the tripartite plus package 
 
Decision to apply for leniency 
in relation to participation in 
cartel A 
Do you disclose 
your involvement 
in other cartel(s)? 
Continue cooperating under 
the leniency programme 
You may benefit from leniency 
plus—receive leniency in relation to 
the other agreement(s) and an 
additional sanctions’ reduction in 
relation to your participation in A  
● Be aware—witnesses will be 
subpoenaed and required to provide 
sworn testimony under a threat of 
sanctions (omnibus question practice) 
● Be aware—individuals may apply for 
leniency independently (on their own) 
● The firm and the individuals 
involved face sanctions for the 
involvement in the other 
prohibited agreement(s) 
● Aggravated sanctions apply for 
not having disclosed your 
involvement in the other 
agreement(s) (penalty plus) 
● Witnesses will be facing 
sanctions for perjury for not 
having disclosed other prohibited 
agreement(s) 
Do you disclose 
your involvement 
in other cartel(s)? 
Is the other cartel 
uncovered? 
You managed to get away 
with it 
Did you 
participate in 
other cartels? 
YES 
YES NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
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Figure 2 Cartelist’s (firm’s) decision making: leniency plus without penalty plus & omnibus 
question in a jurisdiction without sanctions for individuals. 
 
 
 
IV. Concerns surrounding leniency plus 
Thin theoretical underpinnings and an imminent threat 
The US international cartels’ investigations led to the development of leniency plus. Such cases 
were and remain particularly challenging, especially due to the fact that the evidence is often 
located abroad and domestic compulsory legal processes are of limited help.35 Through this 
prism leniency and its further refinement—leniency plus may be seen as carrying a promise of 
enabling, what would be otherwise frequently impossible—an effective fight against foreign 
anticompetitive practices. Hence, it was rational for the US authorities to embrace leniency 
plus and formally add it to the enforcement toolbox. Yet, it is a practice and not theory-
informed instrument. Moreover, leniency plus is generally available and not only in the very 
specific subset of cases involving foreign entities.  
Economists warrant that leniency plus can have adverse, procollusive effects. Its 
introduction can actually make cartels more, not less, stable. Dijkstra and Schoonbeek 
                                                          
35 In some cases international cooperation mechanisms, such us mutual legal assistance treaties, can be used 
to obtain foreign-based evidence. See further Marek Martyniszyn, 'Inter-Agency Evidence Sharing in Competition 
Law Enforcement', 19(1) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 1 (2015). 
Decision to apply for leniency 
in relation to participation in 
cartel A 
Do you disclose 
your involvement 
in other cartel(s)? 
Continue cooperating under 
the leniency programme 
You may benefit from leniency 
plus—receive leniency in relation to 
the other agreement(s) and an 
additional fine reduction in relation 
to your participation in A  
The firm faces sanctions for the 
involvement in the other 
prohibited agreement(s) 
  
Is the other cartel 
uncovered? 
You managed to get away 
with it 
Did you 
participate in 
other cartels? 
YES 
YES NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
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demonstrate that introduction of leniency plus may stabilize cartel formation; that some cartels 
will be formed, which would not exist under a regime without leniency plus.36 Similarly, 
Lefouili and Roux, using a different model, show that leniency plus can make cartels 
sustainable in a wider range of circumstances and extend their duration; albeit it also increases 
firms’ incentives to self-report after a first cartel detection.37  
These models make a valuable contribution to our understanding of the potential 
consequences of the introduction of leniency plus. Unfortunately, while trying to inform the 
policy and looking into the US arrangement, they do not attempt to capture the full complexity 
of the US antitrust enforcement. These models focus on the interplay between firms and 
agencies, disregarding the important impact of criminal sanctions and leniency for individuals. 
Even that more limited analysis of the interactions between firms and agencies in the US 
context, overlooks penalty plus and omnibus question instruments, which change the incentives 
for firms and individuals. Where these features of the US system factored in, perhaps the 
overall conclusions on the effects of leniency plus would be different. 
Yet, even these restricted models are useful. In many jurisdictions some features of the US 
system (eg criminal sanctions, individual leniency, penalty plus) are not present. This makes 
the theoretical findings of possible procollusive effects of leniency plus more directly relevant 
and suggests that policy-makers should be—at the very least—cautious when considering 
introduction of leniency plus and designing it. This is further warranted by the results of a 
recent, extensive practitioners’ survey in the US showing that strategic use of leniency (for 
example, to punish competitors) is a significant phenomenon.38 
Moral dilemma behind the ‘plus’ 
From moral perspective leniency plus may be viewed as problematic. It is an additional reward 
for an entity which has participated in more than one prohibited agreement. In case of leniency, 
the waiver or the reduction of the sanction is a reward for full cooperation with the agency 
(including the provision of evidence). Given the difficulties involved in uncovering and dealing 
with cartels and the fact that leniency’s introduction has a long-term effect of changing the 
market game (as its existence is another factor to be considered by any current and prospective 
violators), this reward may be viewed as justified.  
In case of leniency plus, a violator benefits from leniency with regard to the other disclosed 
agreement. That is not problematic—that reward is justified on the just stated grounds. But 
what basis are there for granting the violator the additional—the ‘plus’—reduction in relation 
to its participation in the firstly reported prohibited agreement? The violator does not provide 
any additional information (beyond that already provided under leniency). Should it be able to 
capitalize twice on the same ‘service’ rendered to the agency? It seems that the answer lies in 
the long-term impact of leniency plus. If it furthers distrust among current and prospective 
cartelists, if it additionally destabilizes cartels and helps prevent their creation, then perhaps 
the ‘plus’ is a fair price to pay for that long-term effect. Yet, since the economists suggest that 
it does not have to be so, that leniency plus may actually have procollusive effects, then this 
                                                          
36 Peter T Dijkstra and Lambert Schoonbeek, 'Amnesty Plus and Multimarket Collusion' (2009), available at 
<http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/EARIE/2009/201/paper.pdf>. 
37 Yassine Lefouili and Catherine Roux, 'Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The effect of Amnesty 
Plus on Cartel Formation', 30(6) International Journal of Industrial Organization 624 (2012). 
38 D. Daniel Sokol, 'Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement', 
78 Antitrust Law Journal 201 (2012), at 212. 
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instrument poses a difficulty. Moreover, as discussed in the next section, leniency plus may 
also weaken deterrence. 
The situation is perhaps somewhat mitigated when the additional reward under leniency plus 
is linked—as in the US system—with the additional penalty under penalty plus, and the practice 
of omnibus question. In such context, a cartelist has no choice—either it cooperates fully and 
discloses all prohibited agreements, or she faces greater sanctions for not having done so. The 
‘plus’ reward can be seen then as a quid pro quo for coming completely clean. There is a value 
in it as fewer resources will be consumed to investigate firm’s other possible, yet uncovered 
violations; and the signal will be sent to other market participants (including current and 
prospective cartelists) that that particular firm is no longer member of any prohibited 
agreement. Penalty plus is there in the background to act as a sanction for abusing this process 
of cooperating and coming clean. Such a more nuanced framework mitigates, if not fully 
solves, the moral dilemma behind leniency plus. 
Systemic problems 
Deterrence is one of the aims of competition law enforcement. To be effective, it should be 
based on a credible threat of sanctions of sufficient scale to exceed the benefits from engaging 
in a prohibited conduct.39 The probability of detection and punishment must also be factored 
in. In regimes imposing only corporate fines for antitrust violations,40 such as the EU, a 
minimum fine to deter anticompetitive conduct should ‘equal the expected gains from the 
violation multiplied by the inverse of the probability of a fine being effectively imposed’.41 In 
the context of collective violations, such as cartels, the same logic applies both to individual 
violators and the cartelists taken together.42 
Various commentators argue that fines currently imposed for antitrust violations are too low 
to secure optimal deterrence.43 In jurisdictions relying only on fines, sub-optimal ones cause 
under-deterrence. Fines reductions under leniency programmes may weaken deterrence 
further, if they go beyond compensating increase in the probability of detection and successful 
                                                          
39 For classic formulations of the optimal deterrence theory see Gary S Becker, 'Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach' in Gary S  Becker and William M Landes (eds), Essays in the Economics of Crime and 
Punishment (UMI, 1974); William M Landes, 'Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations', 50(2) The University 
of Chicago Law Review 652 (1983); George J. Stigler, 'The Optimum Enforcement of Laws', 78(3) Journal of 
Political Economy 526 (1970). See further Bruce Wardhaugh, Cartels, Markets and Crime: A Normative 
Justification for the Criminalisation of Economic Collusion (CUP, 2014) 92-101. 
40 This articles does not attempt to analyse the inter-relationship between different types of sanctions in 
competition law enforcement (such as prison sentences and disqualification orders) and their joint deterring 
impact. Such examination warrants a separate, independent study. 
41 Wouter P. J. Wils, 'Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice', 29(2) World Competition 183 (2006), at 
191. Note that Wils differentates this ‘deterrence’ approach from ‘internalization’ approach advocated by Becker 
and Landes. The latter approach provides that it is not optimal to eleminate all violations since some of them are 
efficient in economic terms. It is underpinned by the Chicago School belief that antitrust should have total 
economic welfare (not consumer welfare) at its heart. See further Becker (n 39), Landes (n 39). 
42 Compare ibid, at 202. 
43 See eg Emmanuel Combe and Constance Monnier, 'Fines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe: the Myth 
of Overenforcement', 56 Antitrust Bulletin 235 (2011); John M Connor, 'Optimal Deterrence and Private 
International Cartels' (2007), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=787927>; Yuliya Bolotova, et al., 'Factors 
Influencing the Magnitude of Cartel Overcharges: an Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Market', 5(2) Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 361 (2008); Cento Veljanovski, 'Cartel Fines in Europe–Law, Practice and 
Deterrence', 30(1) World Competition 65 (2007). 
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prosecution.44 For example, Veljanovski showed that in the EU fines actually paid by violators 
were reduced by forty-five percent on average by leniency and he argues that the EU leniency 
programme ‘appears over-generous’.45 In such a context, the introduction of leniency plus has 
the potential to further weaken deterrence, possibly undermining the whole enforcement 
system, as it leads to the reduction of total sanctions imposed on a cartelist for its participation 
in prohibited agreements. It may lead to the worst possible outcome: society bearing the cost 
of competition law enforcement without a valid return in the form of reduced rate of collusion.46 
V. Leniency plus—in whose interest? 
As with all policies, also in the context of antitrust various groups, market participants lobby 
in their favour. In case of leniency plus some of the important stakeholders are multimarket 
firms, law firms, antitrust agencies, and consumers.  
Since leniency plus is aimed at firms operating at more than one market, they are the 
principal stakeholder. It is rational to assume that most lobbying on their side—if any—will be 
in favour of poor leniency plus design, allowing firms to exploit it and use strategically for 
their own benefit.47 Cartels are profitable so cartelists have funds necessary to attract skills and 
knowhow necessary to structure cartel involvement strategically,48 in order to maximise supra-
competitive profits, while minimising the firm’s exposure to fines. Introduction of leniency 
plus may make this game only more elaborate.49  
Law firms, generally, are likely to lobby in favour of leniency plus in any serviceable form 
(that is, in a form which actually leads to some leniency plus applications), since a new 
instrument will likely create workload and hence billable hours. From law firms’ workload 
perspective it does not matter whether the leniency plus regime is pro- or anticompetitive. 
The true danger lies with the antitrust agencies. They may be tempted—but should not—
favour leniency plus as a tool even if it is not good for consumers. Agencies care about their 
public relations and tend to act to justify their existence (and their budgets). They like to show 
the public at large that they are successful in performing their functions.50 Leniency plus can 
potentially help agencies to open more investigations and improve their statistics. It carries a 
low-hanging fruit of more cases, which are also easier to win. It is so, even if the instrument 
                                                          
44 For more on leniency programmes’ design and their possible effects see eg Massimo Motta and Michele 
Polo, 'Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution', 21(3) International Journal of Industrial Organization 347 
(2003). 
45 Veljanovski (n 43) at 75. 
46 In this vein Buccirossi and Spagnolo when commenting on three scenarios: (1) costly enforcement with 
effective deterrence, (2) no enforcement, (3) costly enforcement with little or no deterrence. Paolo Buccirossi and 
Giancarlo Spagnolo, 'Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?' in Vivek 
Ghosal and Johan Stennek (eds), The Political Economy of Antitrust (Elsevier, 2007) 96. 
47 Firms which do not or did not partake in anticompetitive activities are more likely to focus on their core 
business and other regulatory lobbying (eg in the areas of corporate liability, IP protection, etc.), instead of 
investing scarce resources in trying to influence the design of new antitrust enforcement tools. 
48 Cf n 38 above and text accompanying.  
49 In similar vein Wils notes that ‘successful cartels tend to be sophisticated organisations, capable of learning. 
It is thus safe to assume that cartel participants will try to adapt their organisation to leniency policy, not only so 
as to minimise the destabilising effect, but also, where possible, to exploit leniency policies to facilitate the 
creation and maintenance of cartels.’ Wouter P. J. Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement 
(Oxford: Hart, 2008) para 422. 
50 That is well illustrated by the antitrust agencies often recalling the cumulative amounts of imposed fines or 
jail sentences, which numbers are clearly intended to be perceived—and often sadly are—as a proxy of agency’s 
effectiveness. 
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itself is poorly thought through, prone to strategic use by conspirators and actually contributing 
to consumer harm. Moreover, younger or less-established agencies may favour introducing 
leniency plus also because it may be presented—to the public, domestic and foreign 
counterparts—as a smart move. It may be advanced as a case of learning from the best practice 
of more experienced colleagues, arguably enhancing the reputation of the implementing 
agency. 
Consumers should be in favour only of such leniency plus instruments which serve 
consumer welfare in the long term. Yet consumers, at large, do not represent their interests 
well.51 The area of antitrust is particularly technical and one should not expect that consumers’ 
positions will be well-represented in any dialogue on new policy proposals.52 
VI. Leniency plus around the world 
Although competition law enforcers and commentators often talk about cross-fertilisation 
between regimes, it seems that when one looks into the US system it seems that the fertilisation 
works one way—outwards, with US policies and practices are being exported, transplanted 
elsewhere. Leniency plus is one such example. After being developed in the US, in recent years 
it was introduced in various forms in other regimes. 
The importance of rules design need not be explained to a legal audience. As will be 
discussed, in some regimes leniency plus was designed and implemented in ways which 
additionally (beyond the raised theoretical, moral and systemic concerns) question its effects 
and make it particularly prone to strategic use by cartelists. Therefore, it may often be a case 
of an unsuccessful or failed legal transplantation.53 
As discussed, in the US leniency plus is designed in such a way that a cartelist when 
applying for leniency is obliged to report not only one, but all prohibited agreements it is, or 
should be, aware of. By not doing so, it exposes itself to aggravated sanctions under penalty 
plus. Hence, leniency plus is a compulsory (not optional) part of the leniency programme. Due 
to the omnibus question practice, witnesses are asked about any prohibited agreements under 
the threat of sanctions for perjury. Since the cartelist is required to reveal all prohibited 
agreements, it is entitled to benefit from the additional, ‘plus’ reward only once.54 The scale of 
the reward is not known ex ante. It is determined by the agency in the light of the relevant 
factors. Hence, the strategic use of the instrument is more difficult. Against this backdrop this 
article turns now to provide an overview of leniency plus rules in eleven jurisdictions which 
                                                          
51 Consumer groups tend to lack resources (as compared with business pressure groups), and they often have 
different viewpoints, making it difficult to secure adequate representation and exercise effective pressure on the 
policy-makers. See generally Colin Scott and Julia Black, Cranston's Consumers and the Law, 3rd ed. 
(Butterworths, 2000) 12-18.  
52 That said, at the international level some effort is being put to incorporate consumers’ perspective into 
working of the International Competition Network—currently the leading platform of competition law and policy 
dialogue. See eg Phil Evans, ‘On the ICN in Rio: maps and the meaning of thongs’ available at 
<http://judoeconomics.wordpress.com/2012/05/03/on-the-icn-in-rio-maps-and-the-meaning-of-thongs/>. 
53 For more on legal transplants see Nuno Garoupa and Anthony Ogus, 'A strategic interpretation of legal 
transplants', 35(2) Journal of Legal Studies 339 (2006); Jonathan M Miller, 'A Typology of Legal Transplants: 
Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process', 51(4) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 839 (2003); Pierre Legrand, 'The Impossibility of Legal Transplants', 4 Maastricht 
Journal of European & Comparative Law 111 (1997). 
54 See above n 21. 
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introduced it.55 Brief insights into a few regimes which implemented leniency plus differently 
is followed by a more general comparison and commentary. 
Canada 
In Canada leniency plus is known under the name ‘immunity plus’. Similarly to the US model, 
in Canada a cartelist is required to reveal to the Competition Bureau ‘any and all’ prohibited 
agreements it is aware of.56 In case of failure to do so the Bureau may recommend increased 
penalties for the offences which should have been discovered by the applicant and disclosed. 
If the applicant knew about such offences but failed to report them, the Bureau will call for 
increased penalties and it may also move to revoke the immunity altogether.57 The latter 
element makes the Canadian penalty plus policy stand out as the most stringent one 
internationally. Canada also embraced the US omnibus question practice. Witnesses are asked 
about any criminal activity they are aware of under a threat of criminal charge of obstruction 
under the Competition Act,58 and perjury or obstruction under the Criminal Code.59 The scale 
of the additional reduction under immunity plus is not predefined and is likely to be in the range 
of five to ten percent.60 
UK 
In the UK’s regime an applicant for leniency does not have to disclose all prohibited 
agreements it is involved in. There are no penalty plus or omnibus question instruments.61 In 
effect, leniency plus is only an optional element of the leniency programme. Moreover, a 
cartelists is presumably allowed to avail of it a few times in order to reduce sanctions for its 
involvement in the same prohibited agreement.62 The UK’s leniency plus is not particularly 
generous. The level of the additional reduction is not stipulated. The agency sets it in light of 
the circumstances, yet it is ‘not likely to be high’.63 That said, in at least one case the UK’s 
agency granted an additional reduction of 25 percent under leniency plus.64 
                                                          
55 Leniency plus is not available in the EU regime, nor it is available in the following jurisdictions: Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal (see 
above n 8), Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, and Ukraine. In 
some regimes which have not formally adopted leniency plus, additional cooperation may be taken into account 
(as a mitigating factor) by the agency when setting the fine. 
56 Competition Bureau, Bulletin– Immunity Programs under the Competition Act (7 June 2010), Para 17(b), 
available at <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Immunity-Program-
2010.pdf/$FILE/Immunity-Program-2010.pdf>. 
57 Competition Bureau, Immunity Program: Frequently Asked Questions (5 August 2014), Q42(4), available 
at <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03594.html>. 
58 Under Section 64 of the Canadian Competition Act.  
59 Competition Bureau (n 57) at Q42(7). 
60 Ibid, at Q43(4). 
61 Office of Fair Trading (n 12) at 5.23-5.24. 
62 Compare ibid, at 9.4. 
63 Ibid, at 9.3. 
64 Office of Fair Trading, Decision No. CA98/06/2003, Price-fixing of Replica Football Kit, Case CP/0871/01 
(2003), paras 16 and 661. In another case a firm was granted a reduction of ten percent under leniency plus. See 
Office of Fair Trading, Decision No. CA98/01/2010, Tobacco, Case CE/2596-03 (2010), paras 2.93 and 8.118. In 
some cases the OFT did not explicitly stipulate the scale of the leniency plus uplift. See eg Office of Fair Trading, 
Decision No. CA98/01/2005, Collusive tendering for mastic asphalt flat-roofing contracts in Scotland, Case 
CE/1925-02 (2005), para 410; Office of Fair Trading, Decision No. CA98/01/2006, Collusive tendering for flat 
roof and car park surfacing contracts in England and Scotland, Joined Cases CE/3123-03 and CE/3645-03 (2006), 
para 859. 
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Switzerland 
In Switzerland leniency plus is known under the name ‘bonus plus’. It is an optional element 
of the leniency programme. An applicant for leniency, who did not qualify for immunity, may 
receive up to a 50 percent fine reduction. If she avails of leniency plus and discloses also 
another unknown cartel that reduction—enlarged thanks to leniency plus—may reach 80 
percent, effectively setting a maximal leniency plus uplift at a level of 30 percent.65 The 
leniency plus provisions were first time applied in 2010 with an applicant securing an overall 
(in total) discount of 60 percent.66 
South Korea 
In South Korea leniency plus is an option within the leniency programme. The size of the 
leniency plus reduction is determined by the size relation between the initially and later 
disclosed prohibited agreements. The baseline leniency plus reduction is 20 percent. If the other 
disclosed agreement (or agreements—the South Korean rules explicitly envisage a scenario in 
which a leniency plus applicant discloses more than one agreement) is bigger (in terms of 
turnover) than the initially reported agreement, yet not twice as big, the reduction is 30 percent. 
If the other agreement is more than twice bigger, but less than four times, the reduction is 50 
percent. If it is four times bigger, the leniency plus warranties fine exemption (full reduction 
of the fine for participation in the initially reported agreement).67 Given the generosity of South 
Korean leniency plus rules, they are particularly prone to strategic misuse by cartelists. 
Poland 
The 2014 Amendment Act68 introduced leniency plus to Polish regime.69 Leniency plus is an 
optional part of the leniency programme. The additional reduction is predefined and set rigidly 
at the very high level of 30 percent. The rules do not preclude also benefiting from the 
additional reduction multiple times with regard to the same fine.  
Table 1 Summary of Rules on Leniency Plus 
Regime 
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pre-defined? 
Can a firm reap the ‘plus’ 
reward a number of times 
(in relation to the same 
underlying fine)? 
                                                          
65 Art. 12, Verordnung über die Sanktionen bei unzulässigen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen 
(KG-Sanktionsverordnung, SVKG) of 12 March 2004, available at <http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-
compilation/20040326/index.html>. 
66 Competition Commission (ComCo), WEKO sanktioniert Preisabreden im Bau-Nebengewerbe (4 November 
2010), available at <http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/21071.pdf>. 
67 Korea Fair Trade Commission, 'Notification on Implementation of Cartel Leniency Program' (2009), Art. 
16, available at 
<http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/static/Legal_Authority/Notification%20on%20Implementation%20of%20Cartel%20L
eniency%20Program(2009).pdf>. 
68 The Act of 10 June 2014 amending the Act on the Protection of Competition and Consumers and the Code 
of Civil Procedure, published in the Official Journal of 17 July 2014, item no 945, available at 
<http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20140000945&type=2>. For discussion of these recent changes see 
Marek Martyniszyn and Maciej Bernatt, ‘On Convergence with Hiccups: Recent amendments to Poland’s 
Competition Law’, 36(1) European Competition Law Review 8 (2015). 
69 See Art. 113d of the Act of 16 February 2007 on the Protection of Competition and Consumers, as amended. 
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US compulsory √ √ yes 
no, but it can be 
significant 
no, but the scale of the 
reward depends on a number 
of factors 
Canada compulsory √ √ yes 
no, typically in the 
range of 5-10% 
no, but the scale of the 
reward depends on a number 
of factors 
UK optional × × no 
no, ‘not likely to be 
high’ but at least one 
case of 25% reduction 
identified 
possibly 
New 
Zealand1 
optional × × no 
no possibly 
Singapore2 optional × × no no possibly 
Switzerland optional × × no 
yes, reduction up to 
30% 
possibly 
South Korea optional × × no 
yes, reductions of 20, 
30, 50 and 100% 
see the rules on calculating 
the leniency plus reduction 
Brazil3 optional × × no 
yes, set at the level of 
33% (one-third) 
possibly 
Bulgaria4 optional × × no 
yes, reduction up to 
10% 
yes, explicitly foreseen; total 
reductions under leniency 
plus cannot exceed 30% 
Poland5 optional × × no 
yes, set at the level of 
30% 
possibly 
Italy6 optional × × no 
yes, reduction up to 
50% 
possibly 
1 Commerce Commission, Cartel Leniency Policy and Process Guidelines, paras 3.41-3.44, available at 
<http://www.comcom.govt.nz/the-commission/commission-policies/cartel-leniency-policy/cartel-leniency-policy-and-
process-guidelines/>. 
2 Competition Commission Singapore, Leniency Programme, available at <http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/ccs/en/Education-
and-Compliance/ccs_leniency_programme.html>. 
3 Conselho Administrativo de Defensa Economica (CADE), Programa de Leniencia available at 
<http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?80a063ad729090aabe9fb4>. Compare Ministry of Justice, 'Fighting Cartels: Brazil's 
Leniency Program’, 3rd ed (2009), para 2.9, available at 
<http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/Brazil_Leniencia_Program_Brochure.pdf>.  
4 Решене № 274 of 8 March 2011 available at 
<http://www.cpc.bg/storage/file/Decision%20Leniency%20New%202011.doc>. 
5 The 2014 Amendment Act introducing leniency plus came into force on 18 January 2015. Compare notes 68-69 above and 
accompanying text. 
6 Leniency plus was added to Italian regime only recently through Guidelines on antitrust fines, which were adopted in October 
2014. See Linee Guida sulla modalità di applicazione dei criteri di quantificazione delle sanzioni amministrative pecuniarie 
irrogate dall’Autorità in applicazione dell’articolo 15, comma 1, della legge n. 287/90, para 24, available at 
<http://www.agcm.it/trasp-statistiche/doc_download/4498-lineeguidacriteriquantificazionesanzioni.html>. 
General comparison 
Table 1 provides an overview of the key features of the leniency plus instruments around the 
world. Only in the US—the jurisdiction which developed this instrument—and Canada 
leniency plus, if applicable, is a compulsory part of the leniency programme. In all other 
regimes it is an option—cartelists cooperating with an agency may, but are not required to avail 
of it. This is a first factor making it a tool susceptible to misuse. Moreover, in some jurisdictions 
in which leniency plus is an option the levels of the leniency plus reduction (the leniency plus 
uplift) were predefined. This in itself need not to be detrimental, but in some cases the uplifts 
are set in a rigid manner (stipulating a particular percentage rather than a reductions’ range). 
For example, in Brazil and Poland the uplifts are set not only at very high levels (33 and 30%), 
but they are also unconditional in the sense that an applicant fulfilling the formal conditions 
will benefit from the reduction regardless of, for example, the significance of the other revealed 
prohibited agreement. Furthermore, in some of the regimes a cartelists may, explicitly or 
potentially, avail of a leniency plus uplift more than once, in order to reduce the same fine. 
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This is particularly worrying, especially if one compares that construction with the US or 
Canadian solutions, requiring companies to come completely clean.70  
These last two design flaws may be exploited by multimarket cartelists. They may be 
engaging in more cartels, some of them also of little significance, in order to use them in future 
as tools lowering their exposure to fines for participation in more substantial prohibited 
agreements. These threats of potential misuse of leniency plus come on top of the earlier 
identified theoretical, moral, and systemic concerns relating to leniency plus, raising a serious 
question about the tool’s design and the appropriateness of its introduction. 
VII. Conclusions 
Leniency plus is an element of leniency programmes allowing a cartelist who did not secure a 
complete immunity to get an additional sanctions’ reduction (the plus) in exchange for 
disclosing the agency some other prohibited agreement on an unrelated market. It is a practice-
based tool, developed in the US in the context of international cartels investigations and 
considered by the US agency a successful instrument. Yet, economists show that leniency plus 
can have procollusive effects. Moreover, the instrument poses a moral dilemma as an additional 
reward is granted to multimarket firms which participated in more than one prohibited 
agreement. 
In recent years leniency plus was transplanted into other jurisdictions. As argued in this 
piece these were in most cases only partial implementations. It seems that little attention was 
devoted to the instrument’s place in the broader US plus package and the overall US antitrust 
enforcement system. While in the US leniency plus—when applicable—is compulsory 
(requiring firms to come completely clean under the threat of aggravated sanctions) in many 
other regimes it is an optional tool. Most jurisdictions introduced only the extra carrot (the 
additional reduction of sanctions) but no extra sticks (no penalties for not availing of it despite 
being involved in more cartels), leaving leniency plus prone to strategic misuse. Moreover, 
some regimes predefined the level of additional reductions and made it possible to use leniency 
plus multiple times in relation to the same underlying sanction. Such design flaws create 
incentives for multimarket firms to partake in more than one illegal agreements so as to game 
the system and avail of extra carrots (additional sanctions’ reductions) if needs be. Hence, 
leniency plus becomes a tool potentially serving cartelists, not the consumers. 
If properly designed leniency plus may be a useful tool in regimes with individual leniency 
and sanctions (especially of a criminal nature). Agencies which have the capacity and resources 
to robustly enforce competition laws, for example by challenging multimarket, often 
international cartelists, may put it to good use. In other regulatory frameworks and in regimes 
which enforcement priorities are different or resources are particularly scarce, policy-makers 
should abstain from introducing leniency plus as it can have procollusive effects, it may weaken 
deterrence, and could be exploited by cartelists. Authorities in such regimes will be better off 
by piggy-backing on the enforcement efforts of more resourceful, foreign counterparts. It is 
only rational for a multimarket cartelist which has applied for leniency, for example, in the US 
to file for leniency in other affected jurisdictions which actively enforce competition laws. It 
needs no further incentives such as further reductions of sanctions. These jurisdictions which 
added leniency plus to the enforcement toolboxes, but lack individual leniency and sanctions, 
should abandon it. 
                                                          
70 See also n 21 above. 
17 
 
 
